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Article 6

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
In furtherance of the Review's attempt this year to bring more
material to the Nebraska lawyer which is of interest to him, the
Editors have decided to present a review of the 1969 Unicameral
session. This review is by no means a complete synopsis of the bills
passed by the legislature in the eightieth session. Because of the
great number of bills presented to the session and eventually passed,
we have attempted to select a small cross-section of bills which
were felt to be of particular interest to the practicing attorney.
The bills discussed in this article were chosen because of their
particular relevance to the attorney as an attorney, as opposed to
the attorney as a general member of society. There undoubtedly
are other bills which would have been of more special interest to
particular individuals, but because of time and space limitations
adequate justice to a larger number of bills could not be done.
The selections discussed in the article are presented here in
outline form to enable the reader to select those which are of
particular interest to him and to enable him to grasp the idea of
the breadth of the article.
I. County Attorneys
A. L.B. 1059-Required experience.
B. L.B. 237-Attorneys for hospital districts.
C. L.B. 1179--Salaries and private practice.
D. L.B. 421-Acting and assistant county attorneys.
E. L.B. 154 and L.B. 155--Sovereign immunity.
II. The Courts
A. L.B. 166-Workmen's compensation judges--outside
practice.
B. L.B. 493-Workmen's compensation judges-salaries.
C. L.B.
15--Court of industrial relations.
III. Public Counsel
A. L.B. 521--Ombudsman.
B. L.B. 950-Public defender.
IV. L.B.

330-Professional corporations

V. Post-Conviction
A. L.B. 908--Civil rights restored and expungement of
conviction.
B. L.B. 444-Execution of juvenile court orders while on
appeal.
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VI.

VII.

Taxes
A. L.B. 1415-Bonds required for non-resident contractors.
B. State priority in the collection of taxes.
1. L.B. 1359--Sales taxes collected constitute a trust
in hands of the retailer,
2. L.B. 1363-Withholding taxes constitute a trust fund
in the hands of the employer.
3. L.B. 1361-Lien on property for taxes due.
C. L.B. 504-Changes in language and substance of tax law.
Motor Vehicles
A. L.B. 1174-Title to motor vehicles.
B. L.B. 994-Right-of-way at intersections.
Thomas D. Sutherland '70
Legislation Editor

I. COUNTY ATTORNEYS
On the local level, the office of county attorney is widely recognized as one of the more important public positions.1 In this area
there are two major problems--low salaries and increasing workloads. The last session of the legislature, realizing the existence of
these problems, utilized a number of devices in an attempt to deal
with them.
A. L.B. 1059-REQuia
ExPER~cE.
L.B. 1059 is intended to insure that one who holds the office of
county attorney has at least two years experience. The bill includes
a requirement that applicants for the office of county-attorney in
fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh class counties practice law in Nebraska for at least two years before taking office.2 However, because
of the difficulty some counties are having or might have in obtaining
applicants for this position, the bill contains a waiver clause. If no
person who meets this qualification files for the office ten days
before the filing deadline, the restriction is removed.
B. L.B. 237-ATToR

YS FOR HosprrAL DISRIcTs.

One of the recently passed bills which should lighten the workload of the county attorney is L.B. 237. This bill relieves the county
attorney from the responsibility of representing hospital districts
1 L.B. 421, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
2 The limitations of these counties are as follows: class four, sixteen
thousand and less than twenty thousand; class five, twenty thousand and less than sixty thousand; class six, sixty thousand and
less than two hundred thousand; and class seven, counties of two
hundred thousand inhabitants or more.
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and empowers the hospital districts to employ their own legal
counsel. The committee reports on this bill indicate that this development was made necessary because of the expansion of hospital
districts in various parts of the state, and made possible because
the districts have the power to tax and are therefore in a position to hire their own attorneys.3 It was felt the legal requirements
of such districts would be so great that the county attorney would
not have sufficient time to devote to his other areas of respon4
sibility.

C. L.B. 1179-SALAMES AND PRIVATE PRACTICE.
L.B. 1179 is intended to remove the temptation for the county
attorney to devote the major part of his time to any private practice he might have, while neglecting his less lucrative duties as
county attorney. The bill provides that in fifth-class counties, the
county attorney shall be paid at least $5,400 and further states that:
"In fixing the salary of the county attorney, the county board may
provide that the county attorney shall devote full time to his
official duties and engage in no private legal practice of any kind." 5
The usefulness of the requirement that the county attorney devote
full time to the office is questioned by some who point out that
to require a lawyer to forego any private practice during his term
is to put him in the position of starting in much the same position
as a recent law school graduate if he is defeated for re-election.6
This argument is weakened by the number of county attorneys
who have successfully returned to private practice, after serving
as county attorney without engaging in private practice while in
office. 7 However, most of these cases occurred in the larger counties,
since these are at present the only counties where the county
attorney does. not maintain a private practice.
The legislature realized that it is not practical for all counties
to have a full-time county attorney. Therefore, the bill was designed
to apply only to fifth class counties, and the discretion to invoke
the provisions of the bill is placed in the county board. It is hoped
that judicious use of L.B. 1179 may be a valuable tool which can
be used together with adequate salaries to reduce backlogs which
now exist in some 'county attorneys' offices.8 The salary minimum
of $5,400 is of doubtful significance.The most frequently mentioned
3
4

5
6

7
8

L.B. 237, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

Id.
L.B. 1179, -§1, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
L.B. 1179, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
Personal interview with William Blue, Deputy County Attorney, Lancaster County, Nebraska (Oct. 28, 1969).
L.B. 1179, § 1, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
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salary for a fulltime county attorney is between $15,000-$20,000 and
some counties which have paid $5,400 or less in the past, have found
it difficult to obtain qualified attorneys
D. L.B. 421-ACTING AN) ASiSTANT CouNT ATToRNYs.
A fourth bill designed to aid the county attorney in the performance of his duties and upgrade the quality of service provided
to the public is L.B. 421. The main effect of this bill is to amend
sections 23-1204.01 and 23-1205 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.
The bill expands the situations in which special assistants and acting county attorneys may be appointed. The purpose of the bill,
as expressed by its sponsor, is to provide, upon a showing of good
cause, for those situations where the county attorney is unable to
perform his duties because of leave of absence, sickness or conflict
10
of interest, and to provide for the appointment of assistants.
The usefulness of this bill would seem to lie mainly in those
cases where the county attorney is allowed to maintain an outside practice and the investigation of a felony would involve a
conflict of interest. In a case such as this, L.B. 421 expands section
23-1204.01 which previously provided only for assistance in the
trial and did not provide for any preliminary investigation and
appearances which might have been required.
E. L.B. 154 Ami L.B. I55-Sovi IGN IMMUNITY.
In addition to the aforementioned bills, which in general are
intended to enable a county attorney to devote more of his time
to the traditional duties of the office, and which have to some degree
limited those duties, the legislature passed L.B. 154 and L.B. 155.
These bills will possibly increase the work load of not only the
county attorney but the city attorney as well. Furthermore, where
one individual serves both as county attorney and city attorney,
the increased workload will be especially significant. In order to
understand how these two bills will affect county and city attorneys'
duties it is important to review briefly the doctrine of sovereign

immunity.
In passing L.B. 154 abolishing State immunity, and L.B. 155
limiting the immunity of political subdivisions, the Nebraska Legislature seems to be joining what has become a national trend
toward abolishing governmental immunity.' Two early cases estab9 Id.

10 L.B. 421, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969)

(introduced by Senator Fred Carstens, Chairman, Judiciary Committee).
11 Greenhill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-examined,
and, If So by Whom?, 31 Tax. B.J. 1036 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Greenhill].
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lished the governmental proprietary test of sovereign immunity in
Nebraska. One, decided in 1904,12 held that damages were not
recoverable against municipal governments because of delay or
neglect of their mayor and city council in the performance of a
ministerial duty. The other, decided in 1913,'13 held that when a
municipal corporation engages in a purely business enterprise it is
bound by the same rules applicable to any other person or corporation.
One major issue that had to be decided before this tradition
of governmental immunity could be abolished in Nebraska was
whether the courts could properly undertake to abolish the doctrine or whether such action would be infringing on the powers of
the legislature. Court action abolishing immunity can cause a
number of problems. In California, the problems caused by such
action by the courts were so great the legislature was forced to
suspend the ruling for two years. 14 The Supreme Court of Nebraska,
realizing the problems that might be caused by abolition of governmental immunity from tort claims and also realizing that the
legislature was in a better position to deal with these problems,
refused to abolish all governmental immunity.
However, the court had weakened the doctrine considerably in
recent decisions. In Brown v. City of Omaha,15 a case involving
injuries resulting from alleged negligence in the operation of a
police car, the court held that cities and other governmental subdivisions were not necessarily immune to tort suits arising out of
the ownership and use of motor vehicles. While this decision was
carefully limited in scope and applied prospectively to only those
cases arising thirty days after the opinion was filed, it served as
notice to the legislature to act in this area. 16

12

Gordon v. City of Omaha, 71 Neb. 570, 99 N.W. 242 (1904).

13

Henry v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 140 N.W. 664 (1913).

Greenhill, note 11 supra, at 1069.
15 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968).
16 The doctrine of sovereign immunity was further restricted in Johnson
v. Municipal University of Omaha, 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969),
where the Nebraska Supreme Court stated: "We now hold that cities,
counties, and all other governmental subdivisions, and local public
14

entities of this state, including municipal universities, are not immune
from tort liability arising out of a physical condition, affirmatively
and voluntarily created by the public body on its premises, where the
existence of the condition is not reasonably visible or apparent, and
where the condition constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm to
persons authorized to use and reasonably using the premises for the
purposes intended." Id. at 515, 169 N.W.2d at 288-89.
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Prompted by actions of the Nebraska Supreme Court and article
five, section twenty-two of the Nebraska Constitution 17 the Nebraska
Legislature has greatly restricted the use of sovereign immunity in
Nebraska. L.B. 154 deprives the state of the use of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity for most torts committed by its officers, agents
and employees. Its companion bill, L.B. 155, similarly restricts the
immunity of governmental subdivisions. In addition, L.B. 155 provides for a standardized procedure for bringing tort claims against
political subdivisions under various state statutes. 8 Previously
there had been a wide disparity in the requirements of such statutes. For example, section 39-809 provided that suits for damage
resulting from bridge, culvert or highway construction must be
brought within ninety days from the time the damage was sustained, while actions for damages against airport authorities could
be brought for up to a year after the cause of action arose, without
prior notice.
One significant result of these two bills should be to increase
the number of cases involving governmental liability that will
have to be litigated. In addition, the county and city attorneys
will have to procure insurance for the subdivisions they represent.
II.

THE COURTS

A. L.B. 166--WomHv=N's COMVPENSATION JUDGES-OUTSIDE

PRACTICE.

Another area that is worthy of examination is the legislation
passed in the last legislative session dealing with judges of the
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court. L.B. 166 amends section
7-111 of the Nebraska statutes to include Workmen's Compensation
Court judges within the prohibition placed on certain county and
municipal judges against engaging in outside practice. The committee reports indicate that this limitation was not imposed because
of any alleged conflicts of interest involving any of the judges.
In fact, none of the judges of the Workmen's Compensation Court
engage in outside practice and the purpose of the bill was to eliminate the lack of any restriction against such practice. 19
B. L.B. 493-WoRuVMN'S

CO1PENSATION

JUDGES-SALARIES.

In addition to eliminating the possibility of Workmen's Compensation Court judges engaging in outside practice, the legisla17 "The state may sue and be sued, and the legislature shall provide by
law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought." NEB.
CONST. art. 5, § 22.
Is L.B. 155, § 1, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

19 L.B. 166, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
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ture by passing L.B. 493 also increased the salaries of these judges
from $16,000 to $20,000 per year, although it had been suggested in
the original bill that their salary should be raised to the level of
a district court judge ($25,000) since the work load of the two
types of judges is comparable. The quality of the decisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Court is evidenced by the fact that only
20
one decision of that court has been reversed in the last ten years.

C. L.B. 15-CouRT OF INDusTRIAL RELATIONS.
The most important aspect of L.B. 15 is found in section five,
which authorizes public employers to recognize employee organizations, bargain collectively with them, and enter into written agreements with such organizations. Specifically, the section states:
Public employers are hereby empowered to recognize employee
organizations for the purpose of negotiating collectively in the
determination of, and administration of grievances arising under,
the terms and conditions of employment of their public employees
as provided in this act, and to negotiate and enter into written

agreements with such employee organizations
in determining such
terms and conditions of employment. 21

This provision provides the express statutory authority found to
be lacking in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
City of Hastings.22 In this case the court held:
The generally accepted rule established in other jurisdictions
on the issue, which we adopt, is that a public agency or governmental employer has no legal authority to bargain with a labor
union in the absence of express statutory authority. 23
It should be noted that L.B. 15 did not repeal section 48-810.01 of
the Nebraska statutes which provides that a public employer can
not be compelled to enter into an agreement with a labor union.
However, this section does not affect the authority of the court
to issue a judicial order setting out the items specified in section
48-818 relating to establishing or altering the scale of wages, hours
of labor, or conditions of employment.
The Nebraska bill also expands the jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations to include: "All industrial disputes involving governmental service, service of a public utility, or other disputes as the Legislature may provide ....,"24 Previously the jurisdiction of the court relating to governmental employees was limited
20 L.B. 493, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

21
22
23
24

L.B. 15, § 5, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
Id. at 457-58, 138 N.W.2d at 824.
L.B. 15, § 3, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
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to those cases in which the government was acting in a proprietary
capacity. The language of section 48-801 as amended by L.B. 15
brings teachers under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations, but section^ three of L.B. 15 amends section 48-810 to deny
the court jurisdiction of any person, organizations, or school districts subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Teachers' Professional Negotiations Act, sections 79-1287 to 79-1295 of the Nebraska
statutes, until all provisions of such act have been exhausted without resolution of the dispute involved. However, L.B. 15 did not
specifically repeal section 79-1290 which provides that no board of
education or school board of any public school district in the state
shall be required to meet or confer with representatives of an
organization of certificated school employees unless a majority of
the members of such board determines to recognize such organizations. This conflict raises some question as to the court's authority
in the area.
A third area affected by L.B. 15 is designation of the representative of the employees for collective bargaining purposes. Section
five of L.B. 15 amends section 48-016 permitting parties to mutually
agree to a secret ballot procedure to determine questions of representation for purposes of collective bargaining, for and on behalf
of employees. A significant aspect of this provision is that it does
not set out procedures by which the Court of Industrial Relations
can determine the bargaining agent of the employees. This will
likely result in more problems such as those found in some of the
recent decisions of the court. In one recent case 25 the employer
refused to bargain with an agent other than the organization of
which each employee automatically became a member when employed by the public utility. Two other unions claiming to represent some of these same employees were denied recognition. The
court declined to compel the employer to bargain with these unions
on the ground that an employer does not have to bargain simply
because a person or organization claims to represent its employees.
While an arrangement whereby an employer automatically makes
the employee a member of a specified organization for bargaining
purposes is of questionable validity under section seven of L.B. 15,26
Public Service Employees Council; General Drivers Union Local No.
554; Public Service Employees Local No. 571; and International Union
of Operation Engineers Local No. 38 v. Metropolitan Utilities District
of Omaha (Court of Industrial Relations of the State of Nebraska, No.
21, June 21, 1968).
-6 L.B. 15, § 4, 80th Neb. Leg. 'Sess. (1969), provides: "No adverse action
by thrbat or harrassment shall be taken.against any employee because
of any petition filing by such employee, and the employment status
of such employee shall not be altered in any way pending disposition
of the petition by the court."

25
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the bill does not resolve the problem of the scope and manner of
choosing an appropriate bargaining unit.
Section four of L.B. 15, brought about by the discharge of public
employees for union participation, amends section 48-811 of the
Nebraska statutes. This amendment provides that an employer shall
not discriminate against an employee for filing a petition invoking
the jurisdiction of the court and that his employment status cannot
be changed while the petition is pending. This provision does not
cover an employee's discharge after the disposition of the suit and
seems unneccessarily narrow in that it does not provide for protection for employees engaged in other union activities.
L.B. 15 is another step forward in labor relations in the public
employment field in Nebraska. First, as pointed out earlier, it expands the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. Furthermore, perhaps the most important aspect of the bill is the
explicit authorization for public employers to enter into agreements
with public employees. This goes one step beyond the present
right of public employees to organize. However, because of the
vagueness apparent in the bill its effect is questionable in some
areas.
III. PUBLIC COUNSEL
A. L.B. 521--OMBuDSmAN.
The approval of L.B. 521 with the emergency clause made Nebraska one of the first states to establish the office of Public Counsel,
generally referred to as an Ombudsman. The Nebraska bill is
modeled after the Ombudsman system now in operation in Hawaii
with certain modifications adopted from a similar bill introduced
27
in the Colorado House of Representatives.
One of the major purposes of this bill is to create an agency
where all members of the public will be able to take their complaints about administrative agencies without being deterred by
the seemingly impersonal atmosphere that surrounds many such
agencies. As demands for governmental services increase the number of agencies needed to fulfill these demands also increases. The
size of governmental agencies, it is contended by some,28 tends to
overwhelm members of the public. To those that hold this view,
the office of Public Counsel provides the public with one easily
identifiable place for the public to take their complaints when they
feel they have been unjustly treated by an administrative agency.
In this respect it is important to remember that the proponents of
27 L.B. 521, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
28 Id.
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the bill did not intend the office of Public Counsel to be, strictly
speaking, a legal counsel. 29 This is underscored by the provisions
of the bill, which do not require the holder of the office to be an
attorney. Instead, the bill provides: "The Public Counsel shall be
a person well equipped to analyze problems of law, administration,
and public policy ... ."30 The purpose of such an office is envisioned
by its supporters as a place where information concerning complaints can be accumulated, sorted, and then the findings reported
back to the complaining citizen.31 The role of the Public Counsel
is not limited to responding to complaints; rather, he is given the
power to initiate the investigation of any administrative act or of
any administrative agency.3 2 Furthermore, the bill contains an
authorization for the Public Counsel to "publish his conclusions
and suggestions by transmitting them to the Governor, the Legislature or any of its committees, the press, and others who may be
concerned."3 3 Section fourteen provides that no proceeding, opinion, or expression of the Public Counsel shall be reviewable in any
court. These provisions give the Public Counsel the power to
expose any inequitable dealings of administrative agencies to the
public.
In fairness, it must be noted that all complaints from citizens
do not arise from arbitrary actions of agencies and in many cases
there will be little the Public Counsel can do to resolve a complaint
except explain the reasons for the action. 34 An example would be
a lengthy delay in answering a complaint which is caused by the
lack of sufficient funds to hire an adequate staff. While the Public
Counsel can express the opinion that such an agency needs more
money, the actual appropriation of such funds depends on the
legislature.
Another reason for the creation of a "watchdog of administrative agencies" is the hope that a truly objective view of such agencies can be obtained. The office of Public Counsel is envisioned as
a way of identifying practices of administrative agencies which
are inefficient or outdated but which are continued because there
exists no incentive for change. A related problem that can also
cause inefficiency is the improper delegation of authority.3 5 The
Id.
30 L.B. 521, § 3, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
31 L.B. 521, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
32 L.B. 521, § 6, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
29

33

L.B. 521, § 11, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

84 Gellhorn, The Ombudsman's Relevance to American Municipal Affairs,
54 A.B.A.J. 134 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Gelihorn].
35 McClellan, The Role of the Ombudsman, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 463

(1969).
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size of many administrative agencies is so large that no one man
can effectively make every decision referred to a specific agency.
The role of the Public Counsel in such situations will be to attempt
to remedy improper decisions by calling them to the attention of
a higher official. Often such officials will quickly straighten out
the matter involved since the responsibility for ineptitude in all
decisions is generally attributed to the department head.
In the past, legislators have been forced to perform some of
the duties they now hope can be handled by the Public Counsel.
Specifically, legislators have attempted to solve problems their
constituents were having with state agencies by dealing with these
agencies directly. The advisability of such a system is attacked on
several grounds. First, it is pointed out that such an arrangement
involves the possibility that an agency may feel it is under an
obligation to accommodate a specific legislator who has supported
the agency policies in the past.3 6 The unfairness that results from
basing an agency's decisions on such considerations is not likely
to create a favorable impression of governmental agencies in the
minds of the public. Furthermore, there is the possibility that personal antagonism would prevent a citizen from freely expressing
his complaints to a legislator. Situations such as these should be
minimized by L.B. 521. The bill provides that the office of Public
Counsel is to be filled by a two-thirds vote of the legislature from7
nominations submitted by the Executive Board of the legislature
and the holder of the office must not actively engage in partisan
affairs during his term of office.3 8 Both of these provisions should
help maintain the neutrality of the office.
However, the provision that the legislature elect the Public
Counsel may make it difficult for the Public Counsel to support
truly unpopular causes. Protection of the rights of those with unpopular views might mean that the necessary two-thirds vote for
re-election would be unattainable. Another group that should benefit from the bill is the less affluent, who, in many cases, do not have
the money to take a grievance to court and are often apprehensive
about contacting a legislator personally.3 9 The Public Counsel
should be more accessible to these people. The benefits of freeing
the legislators from such activities includes permitting them to
devote more of their time to studying new laws and possible remedies for defects in existing statutes.
Comment, An Ombudsman in New 'York?, 27 ALBANY L. REv. 84 (1963).
L.B. 521, § 2, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
L.B. 521, § 3, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
39 Gellhorn, note 34 supra,at 138.
36

37
38

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
The Public Counsel system does not preclude use of remedies
available before L.B. 521 was passed. To effectively attain the
objectives previously discussed, there must be confidence that any
complaints brought to the attention of the Public Counsel will be
fairly investigated and a prompt reply given. If an appearance of
impartiality is not achieved then it is likely constituents' complaints will still ultimately reach the legislators, who would then
be forced to once again assume the role of go-between for the public
and the governmental agencies.
One provision of L.B. 521 that might undermine the impartiality
of the Public Counsel is section four, which provides for a six year
term of office. The advisability of having an elected official serve is
sometimes questioned. It is believed that greater independence
and impartiality can be obtained by a career official who holds his
office subject only to retirement or removal for dereliction of duty.40
A final advantage of impartiality is that a citizen who is convinced
his complaint has been fairly investigated by a neutral party is
more likely to accept an adverse explanation.
No matter how carefully a bill of this type is designed, the
Public Counsel is going to cause some resentment among the agencies subjected to investigation. An argument usually advanced by
agencies is that having their records subjected to criticism for misconduct and negligence will lower morale and efficiency within
the agency.4 1 But it is not the purpose of the Public Counsel to
criticize state agencies. Such criticism is only incidental to the
Public Counsel's main function, which is, to serve as a channel
of communication between the public and the various state agencies.
To keep antagonism between the Public Counsel's office and
the state agencies at a minimum, section nine provides that before
any criticism is directed toward any agency or person the Public
Counsel will discuss the problem with that person or agency. Furthermore, section ten provides that if a satisfactory arrangement is
not then arrived at, the Public Counsel can request and receive
the reasons of the agency for not complying with the Public Counsel's request. These two sections should provide some protection
against embarrassment for both the Public Counsel and the state
agencies. Section nine will ensure that the agency about to be cri40 Farley and Farley, An American Ombudsman: Due Process in the

Administrative State, 36 PEa. B.A.Q. 23, 26 (1964). It might be
possible to minimize this problem by a system such as the one provided for state judges in art. V, section 21 of the Nebraska Constitution.
41 Comment, An Ombudsman in New York?, 27 ALBANY L. REV. 84 (1963).
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ticized is aware of the fact and has time to change its position if
the agency should so desire. Section ten should prevent differences
of opinion caused by the failure of the Public Counsel to understand fully the reasons for a specific ruling. Section ten might also
prevent the possibility of the Public Counsel being publicly discredited by openly criticizing a public agency or person for actions
that later turned out to be justified or explainable.
It should not be expected that establishment of the office of
Public Counsel will solve all disputes between individual Nebraskans and state agencies. Many of the complaints received by the
Public Counsel will be based on policy considerations over which
the Public Counsel has no authority. Another problem is the lack
of enforcement powers. Even though the Public Counsel is given
power to subpoena records and compel court appearances under
section four of the bill, and section fifteen provides a fine for obstructing the Public Counsel in the performance of his duties, the
Public Counsel still must rely on public opinion to force the desired
changes. The effectiveness of this method of enforcement will in
turn depend in large measure on the reputation of the individual
holding the office.

B. L.B. 950-PUBLIc DEFENDER.
To comply more efficiently with the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,42 holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
applicable to the states, the last session of the legislature passed
L.B. 950. This bill makes it possible for judicial districts to establish the office of public defender. The bill provides that the district judge or judges shall determine when a public defender is
needed in their district and this decision shall be certified by the
Governor. L.B. 950 provides three standards to be used in determining when the office of public defender should be established. The
first is the number of persons in the district who have been provided with counsel in the previous year. The second is the number
of attorneys in a district available to represent defendants on an
assigned counsel basis. The final consideration is the cost of providing a public defender as compared to the cost of the assigned
43
counsel system.
The adoption of the public defender system was prompted by
the increasing cost of the assigned counsel system. For example, in
the sixteenth judicial district, there were thirty-four appointments
under the assigned counsel system at a cost of $4,000 in 1965.
42
43

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
L.B. 950, § 2, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
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In 1968 this had risen to fifty-three appointments at a cost of
$11,355.43. 4 The cost advantage of the two systems is strongly
debated. However, one study shows the cost of the assigned counsel
system exceeds the cost of the public defender system where the
population of the unit is over 400,000. 45 A further financial aspect
of the bill is the effect of section three which transfers the cost of
the burden of supplying counsel to those unable to obtain counsel
from the counties to the state.
There are a number of problems generally associated with public
defender bills which the legislature has attempted to avoid in
L.B. 950. First, a troublesome question is at what stage in the proceedings a defendant is entitled to counsel. This question has been
posed by the rapidly changing standards imposed on states by
Supreme Court decisions such as Escobedo4G and Miranda.47 Section eight of the bill provides that any person "entitled by law" to
representation by counsel may request the services of the public
defender. This provision should be sufficiently flexible to allow for
any future decisions extending the right to counsel as long as such
decisions are prospective in nature.
Another problem sidestepped by this bill is the level of financial
need that must be shown to entitle an accused to the services of
the public defender. Section eight provides that a person entitled
by law to representation may be required to make a financial statement under oath. A provision such as this may create problems.
For instance, what of the individual who is unable to obtain counsel
because he is charged with a crime which has aroused a great deal
of unfavorable public opinion? Similarly the bill does not provide
for those cases in which a defendant has some funds but not enough
to pay for an attorney in his particular case. The result of the lack
of any standard could be a disparity of requirements in different
districts.
While there are conflicting opinions as to the relative merits
of the public defender system and the assigned counsel system, the
public defender does seem to have a number of advantages over
assigned counsel. One major advantage where the system is adopted
will be to relieve members of the Bar from bearing a great part
of the financial burden of providing counsel for those unable to
provide their own. Furthermore, the public defender will be able
to specialize in criminal cases. This should eliminate the burden
placed on an assigned attorney who handles few or no crimina.
44 L.B. 950, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb.
45 L. Sn.vEa sTm,
DEFENSE OF THE POOR 28 (1965).
40 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963).

47

Miranda v. Arizona, 354 U.S. 486 (1966).

Leg. Sess. (1969).
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cases to familiarize himself with aspects of criminal law not generally used by him. In addition, the assigned counsel had to exercise caution to avoid a charge by the defendant that he was not
given effective assistance of counsel. 48
The major argument against such a system is failure to provide an independent counsel. It is clear that representatives of the
state are presenting both sides of the case; but even so, there does
not seem to be any conclusive evidence that such an arrangement
results in less effective representation for the defendant. 49
Section five of the bill provides that all Nebraska public defenders will be popularly elected for a term of four years. This method
is criticized because it has a tendency to create instability among
the personnel in the office. 50 In addition, it is claimed that there is
a temptation to gain popular support by giving informal advice to
people not entitled to the assistance of the public defender.
The public defender system provides an alternative to the present system of assigned counsel; its effectiveness will only be shown
as judicial districts implement the provisions of the bill.
IV. L.B. 330-PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
Nebraska finally has a professional corporation act. With the
passage of L.B. 330, Nebraska has joined thirty-six states in allowing professional people to incorporate with the purpose of making
available all the benefits otherwise available by way of incorporation.51
For some, the potential benefits would seem to call for immediate establishment of such a corporation. But in view of the Treasury's long hostility to such organizations, despite a long line of
defeats involving litigation over professional service organizations,
many may be hesitant in joining any rush towards incorporation.
The problem involving professional service organizations and
the Treasury's opposition to treating them as corporations, arose
through historical development. It can only be understood, there52
fore, through a brief study of its development.
48

L.B. 950, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

49 SILvEIEN,

note 45 supra at 50-53.
The Public Defender, 30 SASK. B. REV.

50 Symposium of Legal Aid, part 3,

110 (1965).
51 L.B. 330, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

52 For a biographical list of some literature on professional corporations

see Scallen, Taxation of Professionals, 49 MmN. L. REV. 603, 605 n.6
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Scallen].
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The question whether an organization is a corporation for tax
purposes stems from uncertain definitions of "corporation" by the
Treasury, dating back to 1926. 53 Starting in at-least 1914, the definition of a corporation always included "association," but never "general partnerships." 54 It was here also,- that the idea that state
law was not determinative of an organization's tax status, first
emerged. 5 For almost fifty years the Treasury's practice was to
classify as many organizations as possible as associations (that is,
corporations) for federal taxation purposes, even though under
state law, they may have been partnerships. The Treasury looked
at the form of the organization and if it possessed enough of the
characteristics of a corporation (limited liability, continuity of life,
centralized management, free transferability of interest, etc.) it
was taxed as such. 6 This became known as the "resemblance test."
The purpose of this practice
was probably to collect a "double tax"
57
on these organizations.
In 1935, the Supreme Court decided the case of Morrissey v. Commissioner,5 s the leading case for the "resemblance" doctrine. The
Court, holding an unincorporated organization was to be taxed as
a corporation, enumerated the four above mentioned characteristics,
and continuity of holding title to property as relevant in determining an organization's status. This decision encouraged the Internal
Revenue Service to continue classifying all borderline organizations as associations. And in 1936, it issued orders to use the resemblance test on a nationwide basis.59
Also in that year, the Treasury, arguing in favor of corporate
treatment for a medical clinic organized as a trust, won the case
of Pelton v. Commissioner." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the "resemblance" test of Morrissey and held that it should
be classified as a corporation. Thus, despite the fact that the trustees
were the beneficiaries, they probably did not have limited liability,
and corporations could not practice law in the state. The Treasury
now finds this case embarrassing. 61

53 "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies,
and insurance companies." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701 (a) (3).
54

55

56
57

58

59
60

01

Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23
TAx L. REv.1, 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Eaton].
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Scallen, note 52 supra, at 604.
296 U.S. 344 (1935).
Eaton, note 54 supra, at 4-5.
82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
Eaton, note 54 supra,at 5.
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During this period of time and the post-war years, important
changes were taking place in certain professions. Groups of doctors,
especially in the midwest had begun practicing in large groups,
rather than alone or with a small number of partners. These groups
did possess certain corporate characteristics
and the Treasury was
62
successful in treating them as such.
Since they were being taxed as corporations, these groups eventually began to seek treatment as corporations to take advantage of
pension and profit sharing plans. Also with the introduction of
63
steeply progressive income tax rates it was advantageous to do so.
Suddenly the Treasury changed its position, apparently to prevent the further spread of pension and profit-sharing plans.6 In
United States v. Kintner,65 the Treasury opposed corporate treatment for a Montana medical clinic and urged that state laws should
be dispositive of an organizations status. However, the court felt
that federal standards should apply to achieve uniformity in the
income tax law, and since the professional service organization
possessed more corporate than non-corporate characteristics they
should be granted corporation status.6 6
In response to this holding the Treasury promulgated the "Kintner regulations, '6 7 in 1960, which provided that federal standards
must be met for corporate status; however, state law would determine whether the organization did possess corporate characteristics. At the time this seemed like a safe move for the Treasury
to make since few states allowed professional service organizations
to form anything but a partnership 8
This, of course, "backfired" on the Treasury. The emphasis on
local law was an invitation to pass enabling legislation by the
states, granting these groups enough corporate characteristics to
qualify as a corporation.
Therefore, in 1965, the Treasury again issued new regulations,
aimed specifically at professional service organizations.6 9 Under
these new regulations, local law was still determinative of cor62
63

Id. at 6.
Id.

64 Id.
65 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).

66 Comment, Tax Relief for Professional Service Organizations,73 DICK.
L. REV. 486, 487 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 73 DICK. L. REv.].
67 Id. 489 n.25, citing, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cum.
BULL. 409.
68 Id. at 489.

u9 73 DICK. L. REV., note 66 supra,at 489, citing, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)
(1965).
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porate characteristics, but an organization had to have a majority
of the characteristics to get corporate tax treatment.70 The characteristics are: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on business, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralized management, (5) limited
liability, and (6) free transferability of interests.7 - However, the
first two apply to partnerships as well as corporations and therefore
the last four are determinative. The regulations review the last
four characteristics and attempt to show that a professional service
organization does not possess them.72
The 1965 regulations have not been successful for the Treasury.
In the first case tried under the regulations, Empey v. United
States, 73 they were held to be invalid. Empey involved a group
of lawyers incorporated under Colorado law who paid income tax
as a partnership and sued for a refund claiming corporate status.
The court said that the 1965 regulations were an attempt to tax
a corporate entity as a partnership which was inconsistent with the
Internal Revenue Code and the judicial interpretation thereof.74
In a line of decisions since .Empey other courts have reached the
5
same conclusion.7
But this may not end the Treasury's attack on professional service organizations. The recently passed Tax Reform Act of 1969
restricts contributions to pension and profit sharing plans by small
business corporations electing under Subchapter S. Any amount
paid into such a plan, for an employee owning more than five percent of the stock, in excess of the lesser of ten percent of his salary,
or $2,500, will be taxed to the employee-stockholder as ordinary
76
income.
But this question still remains unanswered: what are the advantages of incorporation for the professional person? The question
implies a comparison with non-corporate practice.
77
With the adoption of qualified pension and profit-sharing plans,
a professional corporation may place a maximum of twenty-five
70 Malone, Professional Corporations-A Current Appraisal, 23 ARK. L.
REv. 215, 231, citing, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Malone].
71 Id. at 232, citing, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (2)-(5) (1965).
72
73
74

Id.

272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 853.
75 These include an 8th circuit case, Wallace v. United States, 294
F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
76 Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 531.
77 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 401. For

a good discussion of retirement plans
for partnerships under the Keogh Plan see Hazlehurst, Retirement
Plans for Partnerships,9 LAW OFFICE Ecox. & MANAGE. 265 (1968).
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percent of the compensation paid an employee into a trust fund for
his benefit, and still deduct it as part of the employee's salary.78
However, payments to the fund are not taxed to the employee7 9
and no tax liability occurs until the fund is actually distributed
to him,8 0 or until he has a right to the funds.8 ' Therefore, at retirement the employee can withdraw the funds taking advantage of a
presumably lower tax rate and double personal exemptions. 82 Also
the first $5,000 of the fund which is distributed is not taxed, to the
beneficiary or estate of the deceased employee,83 and certain lump
sum distributions will receive long term capital gains treatment if
made within one year.84 The tax savings can obviously be significant. It has been estimated that a professional person over a thirtyyear period, making $50,000 annually, could accumulate $593,000
through a qualified plan as compared to $191,000 without such a
plan, a difference of $402,000. An employee-owner earning $24,000
can set aside $6,000 yearly without incurring tax liability, thus
saving him approximately $3,000 in federal income tax and $300
in state income taxes annually, assuming a fifty percent tax
bracket. 85
Qualified profit-sharing and pension plans also receive favorable
federal estate and gift tax treatment. If the employee dies without
having drawn on the fund, payments to the beneficiary of the employee are usually not included in the decedent's gross estate, 86 and
the appointment of a beneficiary to receive payments is not considered a transfer by the employee for federal gift tax purposes.87
Upon the death of the employee the corporation can pay up to
$5,000 to the decedent's estate or to his beneficiary as a death benefit. The beneficiary of the payment receives it tax free.88 Obviously
such a tax "break" is unavailable to a non-corporate practitioner.
The corporation may purchase insurance policies for health and
hospitalization costs incurred by the employee and his family, or
may pay the cost directly to the employee. Either is deductible
78 INT. REV. CODE Of
79 Id. § 402(a)(1).
80 Id.
§ 402(a).

1954, § 404(a).

81 Id. § 403(a)(1).
73 DIcK. L. REV., note 66 supra,at 487.
83 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(b).
84 Id. § 402(a) (2).

82

85 Both examples taken from remarks of Senator Whitney, Floor Debate on L.B. 330, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (May 13, 1969).
§ 2039(c).

86 INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
87
88

Id. § 2517.
Id. § 101(b) (2).
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by the corporation, 9 and amounts received by the employee are
not taxed to him0 The sole proprietor or the partnership does not
have this advantage. Only that amount of medical expenses exceeding three percent of his adjusted gross income can be deducted."1 A well-paid person may, therefore, not often qualify for
substantial deduction. But the owner-employee of
a professional
92
corporation may fully deduct his medical expenses.
A professional corporation may also deduct the cost of group life
insurance premiums as an expense.93 The employee incurs no taxable income as long as the coverage is less than $50,000.94 As with
health and accident insurance, life insurance premiums constitute
personal expenses and are not deductible by a non-corporate practitioner.
The taxable year for the partnership must be the same as that
of the partners, unless formed prior to 1954, but a corporation
when formed has the opportunity to select whatever taxable year
it desires.9 5 Under certain circumstances, it may be possible to get
a "one-time" tax savings by postponing the tax on one year's
income and thereby taking, advantage of income averaging. Much
depends on the circumstances, including the individual's willingness to receive his salary-once a year, but the possibility does exist
for substantial tax savings.""
Incorporation also helps to facilitate estate planning through
transferability of interest 97 and continuity of life. Ownership interests simplify the transfer and valuation of such interests upon
death. The interest of the deceased owner can be disposed of under
a cross purchase agreement through a stock redemption, or by sale
to another.98 This, of course, is not possible in a partnership, since
death of a partner causes dissolution and often a decrease in the
value of the practice. 99
89

Malone, note 70 supra, at 218, citing, INT. REV. CODE Of 1954,
§§ 105, 106.

90 INT REV. CODE of 1954,
91 Id. § 213.
92

§ 161.

Malone, note 70 supra, at 218.

1954, § 161.
94 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 79.
95 Id. § 441.
98 Malone, note 70 supra, at 220.
97 L.B. 330, § 8, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1965), provides that shares may only
be transferred to persons who are licensed to practice the profession
93 Id. at 217, citing, INT.,REv. CODE of

for which the corporation was organized. Id. § 8(2) (1)

provides that

the care and treatment of humans shall be considered one profession
for the purposes of this bill.
98 Id. § 12' requires the by-laws or charter to provide for the redemption
or purchase of the deceased shareholder's stock.
99 Malone, note 70 supra, at 221.
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If the corporate tax rate is lower than the rate of the individual,
then retention of earnings can be a tax advantage. The lower corporate rate allows the corporation to build up capital at a lower
cost than if the earnings were taxed to the individual. 10 0 However,
excessive retained earnings may subject the corporation to a penalty tax, 101 although nearly every corporation can retain up to
0 2
$100,000 without a penalty being incurred. '
There are other advantages to a professional corporation. Continuity of life and transferability of shares help to attract good
associates, 0 3 as well as facilitate estate planning.
Limited liability is, of course, important. As damage awards
increase and liability insurance becomes more expensive, the lawyer, the doctor, and other professional people "are becoming increasingly concerned with the possibility of complete financial ruin
because of the negligence of a co-partner. '3 0' Naturally the liability
between the professional and the person for whom the services
are rendered cannot be affected, and L.B. 330 explicitly so provides.
Any person is personally and fully liable for misconduct committed
by him or by any person under his direct supervision and control.
The corporation is liable "up to the full value of its property for
any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by any
of its officers, agents or employees while they are engaged on behalf
of the corporation." 05
Centralization of management is often mentioned as one of the
advantages of incorporation. As a practical matter with respect to
making business decisions, however, a small incorporated organization may be no different than a small unincorporated organization.
Even in large unincorporated organizations there is generally a business manager or executive committee who may function as a board
of directors.
100 Id. at 222.
101 Id. at 222, citing, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.535-3(b) (i) (2) (1959), as amended,
T.D. 6992, 1969 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 10, at 7; 1.537-2 (1959).
102
103

Malone, note 70 supra, at 222, citing, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 535(c).
Glock and Dell, Should a Professional Incorporate?-KinterOrganizations in 1969, 40 PEN.

B.A.Q. 535, 536 (1969)

[hereinafter cited

as Glock].
Rodney, ProfessionalCorporations,7 ALBERTA L. REV. 205 (1969).
105 L.B. 330, § 10, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969). The personal liability of
104

the individual lawyer rendering the service must be maintained, and
restrictions on the liability of the other members of the firm must be
made apparent to the client through the use of a firm name indicating
the fact of incorporation. A.B.A. Committee of Professional Ethics,
Opinion 303, 48 A.B.A.J. 159 (1962).
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But aside from these factors there are disadvantages and caveats
to be observed before reaching a decision on the desirability of
incorporation. Depending on the size of the organization, workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation taxes will
have to be paid. 0 Presumably this would apply both to secretarial
and professional employees. Also social security taxes for the professional will be slightly higher than the self-employment tax, but
the employer's portion of his social security taxes will be deductible
10 7
by the corporation.
"Double taxation" of earnings, to the corporation as profits and
either to the shareholder as dividends or the employee as salaries,
is one problem to be considered. One answer would be to pay most
of the profits out as bonuses or salaries; however, this raises the
possibility of an objection by the Internal Revenue Service that the
salary is "unreasonable.' 1 8 Another alternative in a corporation
with ten or fewer stockholders would be to make an election under
Subchapter S to be taxed as a partnership, if all stockholders
concur. 10 9

A professional corporation may be subject to a penalty tax of
seventy percent on retained earnings if the corporation falls within
the definition of a personal holding company." 0 Personal holding
company income includes amounts received under personal service
contracts with employees owning twenty-five percent or more of
the stock of the corporation."" It may be possible to allocate income
to other employees but the Treasury may oppose this move. It
has announced that examination of professional service corporation
returns will include a determination of whether the Treasury should
exercise its right to allocate income or deduction to prevent evasion
of taxes, in order to clearly reflect income. 1 2 Of course, one possibility would be to pay out all earnings as salaries so no penalty
tax could be imposed, but as mentioned above, large salaries may
invite opposition from the Treasury.
Upon incorporation the professional service corporation may
have to pay a tax on unrealized receivables which it acquired from
106
107

Glock, note 103 supra, at 538.

Id. at 539.

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) (1).
109 Id. § 1371(a). Any election would be deterred by the restrictions
put on contributions to qualified pension and profit-sharing plans by an
electing small business corporation. See text accompanying note 76
supra.
110 Malone, note 70 supra, at 224, citing, INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 542 (a).
1M1 Malone, note 70 supra, at 224, citing, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
543 (a) (7).
108

112 Id.

620

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 49, NO. 3 (1970)

the partnership, if the partnership was on a cash basis. Therefore,
it may be desirable to keep the partnership alive until all the receivables are collected or make a non-taxable exchange," 3 with the tax
4
falling on the corporation when the receivables are collected."
Accounts payable transferred from the partnership to the newly
formed corporation are not deductible when paid"3 and the partnership cannot deduct the payment by the corporation." 6 It has
been suggested that the cash basis
partnership should retain the
11 7
accounts payable and pay them.
These are just some of the problems involved. The decision of
whether to incorporate" 8 must involve a view of the Treasury's
likely position in the future. Although it seems that the "battle"
is over, the long history of opposition to professional service organizations and restrictions on Subchapter S elections in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 indicates that the Treasury may attempt. more
restrictive legislation, at some later date. Whatever the decision,
prior planning is in order at this time should the issue eventually
be resolved in the taxpayer's favor." 9
V.

POST-CONVICTION

A. L.B. 908--CivnL RIGHTS RESTORED

AND EXPUNGEEIENT OF

CONVIC-

TION.
Section one of L.B. 908 provides for the restoration of civil rights
for a convicted felon who has been placed on probation and has
fulfilled the conditions thereof.
Due to an unfortunate omission in the statutes, a person who is
placed on probation for committing a felony cannot have his full
civil liberties restored. If the' same person was convicted120and
sent to a penal institution, his civil liberties can be restored.
313 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 351.
114 Malone, note 70 supra, at 225.
115 Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946).
116 Doggott v. Comm'r, 275 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1960).
117 Malone, note 70 supra, at 226.
118 L.B. 330 provides that it shall apply to attorneys only to the extent and

under the conditions that the Supreme Court of Nebraska shall determine. L.B. 330, § 20, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969). For a discussion of
formation of professional corporations without prior court authorization see Annot., 4 A.L.R3d 383, 388 (1965). Although the bill spe-

cifically names certified public accountants, Op. No. 82, Ops. A=T. GEN.
NEB., (Oct. 23, 1969), states that a certified public- accountant or
group of public accountants may not form a professional corporation
to perform accounting service.

119 Malone, note 70 supra, at 235.
120 L.B. 908, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Mar. 28,

1969).
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"Civil rights" as referred to in section one means, at least, the

right to vote,'121 the right to hold public office, 122 and probably the
right to serve on juries and as an elector.123 But the term has never
been adequately defined in Nebraska. It would seem that the legislature should have alleviated this problem since this is the very
area with which section one of L.B. 908 is involved.

The need for L.B. 908 arose because the position of those who
have been put on probation has never been clear. The Board of
Pardons has refused to act in this area on the theory that probation
is not "conviction.' 1 24 For those who have been incarcerated or paroled, upon fulfilling the requirements of his sentence or parole, the
Board of Parole issues
a certificate of discharge which restores the
125
person's civil rights.
Section two of L.B. 908 is distinct from section one. It provides
that upon fulfilling the requirements of probation, the offender may
petition the sentencing court to set aside the conviction for the
purpose of removing all civil disabilities. 26 In determining whether
to do so the court is instructed to consider: (1) the behavior of
the offender while on probation; (2) the likelihood of further criminal activity; and (3)any other relevant information. 27 If the court
determines that it is in the best interests of the public and the
offender to do so it may issue such order.
The purpose of section two is to relieve a person who has fulfilled
the terms of his probation of the disqualifications and disabilities,
which he is under, other than "civil rights." This section removes
one of the bases for denying the offender a license to practice certain professions. Conviction for a felony is the basis28for denying
nursing,12 9
a license for the practice of medicine and surgery,
121

The right to vote is denied a convicted felon by the state constitution.
VI, § 2.
The right to hold public office is also denied by the state constitution.
NEB. CONST. art. XV, §2.
The right to serve on juries and to serve as an elector is denied by
statute. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-112 (Reissue 1964).
Remarks of Attorney General Meyer, L.B. 908, Files of Judiciary Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Mar. 28, 1969). This bill does not help in
defining "conviction" for other purposes.
L.B. 1307, § 49(4), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
L.B. 908, §§ 2(1), 3(2), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969). L.B. 1307, § 60(2)
allows the Board of Pardons to empower the Governor to authorize a
pardoned felon to possess a firearm in commerce. This disability is
imposed by federal law.
L.B. 908, § 2(2), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 71-102 to -104, -147(4) (Reissue 1966).
NEB. CONST. art.

122

123
124

125
126

127
128

129 NEB.

REV.

STAT.

§ 71-1,132.29 (Reissue 1966).
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barbering, 130 cosmetology, 131 and massage. 132 Conviction for a felony
is not only grounds for refusing a license as a private detective, but
the license is affirmatively denied, providing a full pardon has not
been issued. 133 Therefore, the licensing agency must grant a license
34
if no other grounds for denial can be shown.
However, section two also provides that setting aside of the
conviction shall not: (1) require reinstatement of any employment or position; (2) preclude proof of a plea of guilty when relevant to the determination of an issue involving the rights or liabilities of someone else; (3) preclude proof of the condition as evidence
of the commission when the fact of commission is relevant for the
purpose of impeaching the offender as a witness except that the
order setting aside the conviction may be introduced in evidence;
or (4) preclude use of the conviction for the purpose of showing
135
recidivism.
With these broad exceptions the question arises whether L.B.
908 is really effective in removing civil disabilities and disqualifications, arising from conviction. What effect will section two have
on discrimination against past offenders by private employers?
Certainly it does not, by its express terms, provide that such an
employer cannot deny employment on this basis. Another question
may concern the relationship between section two and municipal
ordinances where conviction for a felony may be the basis for
denying a license.
If the object of the bill is to remove the disabilities arising from
convictions then its usefulness is substantially reduced by these
broad exceptions. L.B. 1379136 is an interesting contrast to section
two of L.B. 908. It provides that when a minor has been adjudged
delinquent or in need of supervision, and has completed his program, any interested person may request the court to set aside the
adjudication. After a hearing the court may issue an order setting
aside the adjudication. When such order is made the order shall
also require that all records concerning the adjudication be sealed.
These records may then only be made available upon a court order
for good cause shown. Certainly minors stand in a different posi130 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 71-217 (Reissue 1966).
(Reissue 1966).

131 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-331

132 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2717
133 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-3206
complete listing.
134
135

136

(Reissue 1966).

(Reissue 1966).

This is, of course, not a

The rulings of state agencies are reviewable by the courts. NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 84-917 to -919 (Reissue 1966).
L.B. 908, § 4, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969). MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.5
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) explains the reasons for these exceptions.
80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
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tion than adult felons on probation, but nevertheless, it would seem
that something nearer the provisions of L.B. 1379 would be more
in line with the policy and purposes of section two of L.B. 908.
L.B. 908 is retroactive, but it will not be available to any offender
who has been convicted of a felony within ten18years
prior to the
7
date of the conviction requested to be set aside.
B. L.B. 444-EXECUTION OF JUVENILE COURT ORDERs

WHILE ON APPEAL

The legislature also performed a "filling-in" function with the
passage of L.B. 444.138 The bill provides that an appeal from a juvenile court order to the district court shall not stay the execution
of the juvenile court order.
By prior law, the juvenile court lost control of the particular
child during the time between filing of notice of appeal from the
juvenile court to the district court and final settlement therein. Too
often during this interim the individual was allowed to run freely,
and he frequently got into more trouble.3 9 Under L.B. 444, the order
of the juvenile court will stay in effect during the appeal.
Some states give jursidiction over the case to the court to which
the appeal is taken,'140 but the approach taken by Nebraska seems
to be the most common. 141 By comparison, when on appeal from
district court to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, the supreme
court has jurisdiction over the case while awaiting the outcome,
and the supreme court can order suspension of the sentence during
142
the appeal.
VI. TAXES

A. L.B. 1415-BoNDs REQUIRED

FOR

NON-RESIDENT CONTRACTORS.

L.B. 1415 is directed at assuring that the state receives taxes
due from non-resident contractors.
The bill provides that non-resident contractors, who desire to
do business in Nebraska, must register and file a bond with the
137
138
139

L.B. 908, § 6, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
L.B. 444 amends NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202 (Reissue 1968).
Remarks of Senator Carstens, Floor Debate on L.B. 444, 80th Neb. Leg.
Sess. (Mar. 6, 1969).

140
'34

MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 56 (1965).
MVtcH. Comp. LAWS ANN.§ 712A.22 (1968); MiNw. STAT. ANN. § 260.291
(Supp. 1969).

142 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1914 (Reissue 1964).

§ 29-2306 (Reissue 1964).

See also NEB. REv. STAT.
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Tax Commissioner. 143 A bond of not less than $5,000 must be filed
with each contract. However, the Tax Commissioner may at his
discretion allow the execution and filing of one bond for all contracts required to be registered.
A contractor is defined as an individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association of persons engaged in the construction, repair, demolition, etc., of buildings, roads, sewers, gas and water
mains, levees, dams, airports and "every other type of structure
project, development or improvement coming within the definition
of real and personal property .... ,1-44 The bill defines a non-resident
contractor as one who is neither domiciled in Nebraska, nor maintains a permanent place of business in Nebraska, 45or if so domiciled,
spends less than six months a year in the state.
Failure to comply with the provisions of the bill involves several
different liabilities and disabilities. The filing of the bonds are a
condition precedent to commencing work on the contract. But if
work should be commenced, the Attorney General of Nebraska, or
the county attorney of the county in which the contract is to be
performed is permitted to proceed by injunction to prevent performance until there is compliance. Also, any person who fails to
comply is guilty of a misdemeanor, and each day of activity upon
the contract is a separate offense. 46 The penalty provided is a $1,000
maximum fine, six months imprisonment, or both.
This recurring penalty clause is important. It is usually declared
that where the penalty is recurring the contract is void, as being
against public policy, that is, the requirement is for the protection
of the public. Thus a non-complying contractor cannot enforce a
contract made without compliance. But, where the penalty is imposed only once, then the contract is enforceable. This is the usual
47
situation where the requirement is a revenue measure.'
Although this bill is for security and collection of revenue, it
specifically provides that any contractor who fails to comply with
the act "shall not be entitled to maintain an action to recover pay143 Registration, licensing and/or bonding of contractors is a widely
followed practice. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7000 et. seq. (West
Supp. 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-14 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 18.27 et seq. (Supp. 1968); Wis.

STAT.

ANN. § 71-10(14) (a)

144 L.B. 1415, § 1(1), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
145 L.B. 1415, § 2, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
146
'47

(1969).

L.B. 1415, § 10, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 835, 836 (1924); Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1226 (1926);
Annot., 118 A.L.R. 646 (1939); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 676 (1939); Casenote,
23 S. CAL. L. REV. 98 (1949). Compare WASH. REV. CODE A.
§ 18.27.040
(Supp. 1968) with L.B. 1415. The Washington statute was upheld and
discussed in Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wash. 2d 487, 408 P.2d 269 (1965).
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ment for performance in the courts of this state on such contract."' 48
Therefore, it appears that non-compliance with the statute would
be a very tenable defense to an action for payment by a non-resident contractor since this concept is also consistent with the same
implication from the recurring penalties clause.
The Supreme Court of California, in an opinion by Justice Traynor, has held that a contractor cannot recover compensation under
the contract if he had not complied with the requirements of the
law regardless of the harshness of the rule, or unjust enrichment. 49
The California statute' 50 in question required the licensing of California contractors and was designed for the protection of the public.
It required a contractor to allege and prove, upon an action to
recover under a contract, that at all times during performance he
was licensed.
The question may arise whether a non-resident contractor may
sue for anticipatory breach, since L.B. 1415 only provides that the
contractor cannot recover payment for performance. In Brunzell
Construction Co., Inc., of Nevada v. Barton Development Co.,' 5 ' a
California Court of Appeals said that to hold for the plaintiff-contractor "would lead to the odd rule that one who could not recover
for full performance of a contract could nevertheless recover for
not performing it at all." But, it may be possible for a contractor
to recover in tort, the proof of the contract going to show the circumstances under which the plaintiff's services were rendered and
52
his money expended.
The bill may also have the effect of putting non-resident contractors on a more even footing with resident contractors in bidding on jobs. Formerly if a non-resident contractor could escape
paying the taxes due, then presumably his bid would have been
reduced by that amount of taxes, maling it more likely that the
non-resident contractor would have his bid accepted.
L.B. 1415, § 9, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957);
accord, Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 264, 270, 162
S.E.2d 507, 511 (1968), where the court said that the contract made
without compliance does not make the contract totally without effect.
The owner may sue for breach.
150 CAL. Bus. & PRor. CODE § 7000 et seq. (West Supp. 1964).
151 240 Cal. App. 2d 442, 444, 49 'Cal, Rptr. 667, 668 (1966). This suit
involved a contract price of $1,450,000.
152 Grant v. Weatherolt, 123 Cal. App. 2d 34, 266 P.2d 185 (1954).
See also Proffitt & Durnell Plumbing, Inc. v. David H. Baer Co., 247
Cal. App. 2d 518, 55 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1966).
148

149
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L.B. 1415 also provides that any contractor who contracts with
a subcontractor subject to the act must with-hold enough money on
the contract with the sub-contractor to guarantee that all taxes
due because of the contract be paid. Failure to comply will make
the general contractor liable and the Tax Commissioner is empowered to go against such contractor as though the services had been
rendered directly by him. Also, the assignee of a contract subject
to L.B. 1415 takes the contract with the same limitations and prohibitions as the assignor.

B. STATE PRIORITY IN THE COLLECTION OF TAXES.
1. L.B. 1359-Sales taxes collected constitute a trust fund in the
hands of the retailer.
L.B. 1359 amends section 77-2712 of the Nebraska statutes. It
provides that funds collected by the retailer become a trust fund
held by the retailer for the state and that he is the state's agent.
Section 77-2712, before L.B. 1359, provided only that the state had a
lien.
Although the State of Nebraska has not had any serious difficulty
in this area, the change is aimed at giving the state an argument
that the tax money should be paid first in the case of bankruptcy of
the retailer. Some states have had losses run as high as three per13
cent when the state could not get any priority over other creditors 5
54
through the use of a lien concept.
A trust fund is not an unusual theory.1'r Neither is it new. The
New York statutory trust dates back to 1930.156
The statutory lien is the traditional device used by the states
to assure collection of both taxes and other claims. However, in
proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act the lien may fail to achieve
15

Remarks of Senator Burbach, Floor Debate on L.B. 1359, 80th Neb.
Leg. Sess. (May 26, 1969). Presumably under the trust theory a

criminal action would lie against a retailer who refused to turn over
the tax receipts, since the money becomes the State's when received
by the retailer.
154 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §444(a) (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-164.37 (1965); PA. STAT. tit. 72, § 3403-548 (1964). For the
type of situation the Tax Commissioner is trying to avoid in Nebraska
see First Nat'l Bank of Altoona v. Brown, 27 Pa. D.&C.2d 569, (1961);
Gregory v. Bill's Auto Exchange, Inc., 29 Pa. D.&C.2d 285 (1962)
where it was held in both cases that the state had no priority except
as provided by the statute which protected prior mortgages of record.
155 IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2664(a) (Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §
327 (Supp. 1969); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5739.03 (Page Supp. 1969);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.08.050 (Supp. 1969).
156 See, N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 70 to 79 (McKinney 1966).
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its purpose, since under section 67c, tax liens on personal property
not accompanied by possession are postponed to administrative
expenses and wage claims. The sales tax trust aspires to improve
the states position over its customary lien statute; and the field
contain a
seems clear to do it, since the Bankruptcy Act does not
157
direct limitation on the use of statutory trust formulas.
Perhaps the argument will be made that the trust is only a lien
in reality and should therefore fall within the Bankruptcy Act. If
it is only an effort to avoid the Bankruptcy Act, a court may regard
it as such. However, if the trust as created is in harmony with the
method of tax collection, there should be no reason to call the trust
a lien merely because it is imposed by statute.158
For this reason it is of considerable importance, whether the
retailer is a collector of the tax or whether he is himself the taxpayer. Where the incidence of the tax falls on the purchaser, the
retailer-trustee is simply a conduit. In that case the trust would
appear to be consistent with the nature of the relation between the
state and the retailer; the retailer's bare legal title as trustee is
not out of place.'5 9
The incidence of the Nebraska tax is not entirely clear. On the
one hand, the retailer is required to collect the tax from the consumer; on the other hand, the amount of the tax is a debt of the
retailer to the state.160 But, when read in conjunction with the section forbidding the retailer to advertise that he is absorbing the
tax,16 and the section requiring separate listings of the sales
tax,16 2 the indication is that the Legislature intended the incidence
to fall on the purchaser. Therefore, the trust fund concept is consistent with the conceptual requirement that the tax fall on consumers. Assuming a valid trust, satisfaction of the state claim, before
other creditors, may depend on the ability of the state to trace the
proceeds of collection. The problem is vital where the merchant has
not segregated the funds from others in the course of business. 163
157 Note, State Priority to Sales Tax Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 40 IND. L.J.
233 (1965) (citations omitted).
158 Id. at 235.
159 Id. at 238.
161 NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2703 (1) (b) (Supp. 1967).
162 NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2703(1) (c) (Supp. 1967).
168 Note, State Priority to Sales Tax Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 40 IND. L.J.

233, 244 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, 40 Izm. L.J.]. Senator Burbach indicated that the bill does not require setting up a custodial
account, Floor Debate on L.B. 1359, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (May 26,
1969); Mr. Del Rasmussen, formerly Chief of the Legal Division of the
Tax Commissioner's Office has said much the same thing, L.B. 1359,
Files of Revenue Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Apr. 30, 1969).
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Where there is no segregated fund, the government must, like any
other beneficiary of a trust, follow the diverted fund into the property to which it can be traced.164
2. L.B. 1363-Withholding taxes constitute a trust fund in the
hands of the employer.
L.B. 1363 is identical in purpose to that of L.B. 1359. The money
withheld by an employer from his employees for income taxes will
constitute a trust fund held for the State of Nebraska. This, of
course, is the type of system used by the federal government for
collection and assessment of federal income taxes. 6 5
As with L.B. 1359, L.B. 1363 does not require the setting up of a
separate account. Therefore, the same problem may arise, that is,
the requirements of tracing, if the retailer or the employer comingles his funds with those of the state, and then becomes
bankrupt.'66
It has been held that a bankrupt, owing social security and withholding taxes, who draws a check for the amount owed, and certifies it, effectively takes the fund out of the assets and from that
moment, it belongs to the government, though the government
never receives the check. 167 In MountaineerEngineering Co. v. Bossart,168 the check was mailed for the taxes, but was not honored
because an attachment had been levied on the bank account in
the interim. The court ruled that the check was not an assignment
of the funds; that is, there was no tracing. It appears, therefore, in
this area of considerable uncertainty, that the Legislature should
require some type of separation of taxes from those of the retailer
or employer to assure the effectiveness of the trust fund concept.
3. L.B. 1361-Lien on property for taxes due.
L.B. 1361 is a companion bill to L.B. 1359 and L.B. 1363. It
amends section 77-27,104 of the Nebraska statutes and makes three
changes or additions to the existing law.169 It is aimed primarily
at the collection of income taxes.'7 0
164 Note, 40 IND. L.J., note 163 supra, at 244.
165 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7501.
166 Id. § 7501 Il(B) (1).
Note, 40 IND. L.J., note 163 supra, at 245, citing, In re State Motors, Inc.
168 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Mich. 1958).

167
168

Id., citing, 133 W. Va. 668, 57 S.E.2d 633 (1950).

169 L.B. 1361 is very similar to the North Dakota statute relating to sales
taxes. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39.2-13 (Supp. 1969). This statute is discussed in In re Travis Bros. Body Works, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.D.
1966).
170 Remarks of Senator Burbach, Floor Debate on L.B. 1361, 80th Neb.

Leg. Sess. (May 26, 1969).
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First, the lien that the state has for failure to pay income or
sales tax arises at assessment under L.B. 1361. The taxpayer no
longer has sixty days within which to pay as he did under the
law before amendment. The amendment is designed to bring this
section into conformity with other parts of the 1967 Revenue Act. 171
Second, the lien provided for will now attach to the personal
as well as to the real property of the taxpayer. Under prior law the
lien attached only to real property. It was felt that this addition
would make the law more effective against transients owing income
tax to the State of Nebraska, who have no real property,
but do
7 2
own some personal property, such as an automobile.'
The third change, or addition, is designed to protect the state
against advances on an existing mortgage, which were made after
the state tax lien accrued. The bill provides:
[T]he lien herein provided, when notice thereof has been filed in
the proper clerk's office, shall be subject to such prior mortgage
unless the Tax Commissioner also notified the mortgagee of the
recording of such lien in writing, in which case any indebtedness
thereafter created from mortgagor to mortgagee shall be junior
to the lien herein provided for.173
Another purpose of L.B. 1361 was to clear up the language of
the statute and serve as a backup measure to L.B. 1359 and L.B.
1363. Senator Burbach said:
This bill would aid and afford for the collection of sales and
income tax both and in this instance it would provide that the
lien would be there in the case of the income tax more explicitly
than the sales tax and [where?] the trust fund is held up.174
These bills certainly indicate a desire on the part of the eightieth session of the legislature to "tighten up" on collection of
taxes. L.B. 1415 goes so far as to create a criminal penalty and perhaps even interfere significantly with private contractual rights
and/or remedies. L.B. 1359 and L.B. 1363 move away from the
"traditional" device of a lien to the trust theory, which, if valid,
will give the state a stronger position in collection of taxes. This
trust theory also provides an avenue for criminal sanctions in
extreme cases against an employer-retailer trustee who refuses to
pay over tax monies. Taken together with L.B. 1361 these bills
should reduce the amount of tax monies which the state is unable
75
to collect.
171 Remarks of Mr. Del Rasmussen, formerly Chief of the Legal Division
of the Tax Commissioner's Office, L.B. 1361, Files of Revenue Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Apr. 30, 1969).
172
173
'74
175

Id.
L.B. 1361, § 1(3), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969) (emphasis added).

Floor Debate on L.B. 1361, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (May 26, 1969).
It is interesting to note that these bills relate almost entirely to the
sales and income taxes.
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C. L.B.

504-CHANGES

IN LANGUAGE

AND

SUBSTANCE

OF TAX LAW.

Taxes were also the concern of L.B. 504, but most of the changes
made by L.B. 504 are "merely perfunctory housekeeping measures."'17 6 It passed with the emergency clause.
The bill amends section 77-2702 (10) (c) of the statutes by defining "admissions," for sales tax purposes, to mean "the right or
privilege to have access or to use a place or location."'177 This is
an attempt to clarify the definition in gray areas, but the intent is
to broaden the meaning. With the passage of L.B. 504 such previously non-taxable events as the use or entry into golf courses,
bowling alleys, pool tables and swimming pools will now be tax78
able.

L.B. 504 also amends section 77-2703 of the Nebraska statutes so
that the tax on the sales of trailers and semi-trailers is now "[t]he
liability of the purchaser"' 7 9 making this the same as motor vehicles.
County treasurers will now collect the sales tax on trailers and
semi-trailers at the time application for registration is made by the
purchaser of such trailer. It was felt that there is no basic difference
between the sale of motor vehicles and trailers, and therefore if one
group of retailers were to be exempted from liability under section
77-2703 (1) (a), then the other should also be exempt.180
Section 77-2704(5) originally provided that subsidiary companies could lease tangible personal property to the parent company without incurring sales tax liability, but it did not exempt
the opposite practice. L.B. 504 amends this section to exempt leasing from parent to subsidiary and also "brother-sister" leasing
arrangements, that is, where the construction company and the
equipment company are owned by common shareholders. Also
included in this section are joint ventures where it is necessary to
have a separate company handling the equipment in order to
recognize the contributions of the various parties and cost-plus
work where it is desirable to have the equipment handled as a
176 Remarks of Mr. Del Rasmussen of the Tax Commissioner's Office, L.B.
504, Files of Revenue Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Mar. 31, 1969).
177 L.B. 504, § 1(10) (c), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

178 Remarks of Senator Burbach, Floor Debate on L.B. 504, 80th Neb. Leg.

Sess. (Aug. 11, 1969). Rule TC-1-44, Amended Rules for Sales and
Use Tax (Oct. 1, 1969), includes: theatres, shows, parks, race tracks,

skeet and trap ranges, zoos, football stadiums, art exhibits, night clubs,
dance halls, cabarets, auditoriums where lectures and concerts are
given, fairgrounds, and many other such events. Id. at 8.
179 L.B. 504, § 2(1) (j), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
180 Remarks of Mr. James Preston of the Nebraska Motor Carriers Assoc.,
L.B. 504, Files of Revenue Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Mar. 31,

1969).
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separate item. This amendment is an effort to have the entities that
reflect an enterprise within the heavy construction industry all
receive the same treatment. 181
As introduced, L.B. 504 would have removed the exemption
of non-profit organizations from sales tax liability.
As the law stood before L.B. 504, a contractor could either be a
"retailer" or a "consumer" of the supplies under a construction contract. The contractor could pay the tax to the supplier and pass
it on to the owner, or he could himself be the retailer, getting a
sales tax permit and giving the supplier a resale certificate. In the
latter situation he would remit the sales tax from the customer
to the state. The problems developed when dealing with exempt
organizations, such as hospitals or governmental subdivisions.
If the contractor was the consumer, on a tax exempt job, he
would pay the tax and apply for a refund from the state. In the
application the contractor would have to include all invoices and
statements from his supplier, which on a large contract would be
a substantial number. This procedure was burdensome, and took
up much time in both the Tax Commissioner's office and the contractor's office. Also, during the period of time during which
invoices were checked, often several months, the contractor's money
was tied up in taxes. This was especially hard on small contractors. 18
The contractor on a tax exempt job who was also the retailer
would not pay the tax. Instead he would get a resale certificate, and
accept from the exempt organization an exemption certificate in
lieu of taxes.
The real problem arose because contracts for these organizations are often lump sum contracts. The law as interpreted provided that on a lump sum contract, the contractor could not be the
retailer, but had to be a consumer, and "pay the tax on his supplies
to his supplier regardless of whether he is performing a contract
for an exempt organization"'8 3 and could not, of course, pass on
181 Remarks of Mr. Malcolm Young for Greater Omaha Heavy Con182

183

tractors Assoc., L.B. 504, Files of Revenue Committee, 80th Neb. Leg.
Sess. (Mar. 31, 1969).
Remarks of Mr. Dean Kratz, appearing for Nebraska Building Chapter
of the Associated General Contractors; The Omaha Building Contractors Employers Assoc.; The Building Contractors Employers Assoc.
of Lincoln; and The Tri-City Employers Assoc., L.B. 504, Files of
Revenue Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Mar. 31, 1969).
Rule TC-1-17, Sales and Use Tax Rules and Regulations 13 (as revised,
March 1, 1968).
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the tax. Therefore, contractors were paying sales tax for supplies
used in a construction contract for many projects without reimbursement.
This attempt to remove the exemption met opposition. It was
pointed out that if hospitals are not exempted, the cost on a
$15,000,000 project would be increased $300,000. With hospital beds
costing $20,000, the number of beds would be reduced by fifteen.
The same would apply to nursing homes, already in short supply.
On a $5,000,000 project, with beds costing $10,000 each, the number4
of beds would be reduced by ten at a sales tax rate of two percent.18
As passed, the bill provides that a contractor will always be a
consumer, passing the tax on to the customer. In the case of an
exempt organization, a refund to it will be calculated by multiplying the sales or use tax rate times a sum equal to sixty percent of
the total contract price. The figure of sixty percent, which is to
represent the cost of supplies in the contract, was worked out by
those interested in the area. l8 5 The organization claiming the
exemption will have to submit any evidence as required by the Tax
Commissioner to establish such total contract price.
The bill also defines the location of the taxable event for the
purpose of the Local Option Revenue Act authorized by L.B. 578.18
It redefines gross receipts of telegraph service to mean only intrastate service, 87 to be in harmony with the furnishing of telephone
communications service on intrastate tolls. It makes "community
antenna television system" (cable TV) consonant with the definition of retailer in section 77-2702(12) (a) (iv)188 of the Nebraska
statutes.
VII. MOTOR VEHICLES

A. L.B. 1174--TITLE TO MOTOR VEHICLES.
The Legislature made an important change in the acquisition
of title to a motor vehicle with the passage of L.B. 1174. It passed
with the emergency clause.
The bill provides that no title shall pass unless the buyer has
physical possession of the vehicle and:
184

Remarks of Mr. Stuart Mount of the Nebraska Hospital Assoc., L.B.

504, Files of Revenue Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Mar. 31, 1969).
185 Remarks of Senator Burbach, Floor Debate on L.B. 504, 80th Neb. Leg.
Sess. (Aug. 11, 1969).

Generally the retailer's place of business.
L.B. 504, § 1(4) (b) (ii), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
1s8 L.B. 504, § 1 (12) (a) (iv), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
186
187
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[A] certificate of title or a manufacturer's or importer's certificate
duly executed in accordance with the provisions of this act, and
with such assignments thereon as may be necessary to show title in
the purchaser thereof or an instrument in writing required by
section 60-1417....189

L.B. 1174 amends section 60-105 of the Nebraska statutes which
had provided that for title to pass the purchaser must only "have
had issued to him a certificate of title ...or delivered to him a manufacturer's or importer's certificate."'-9 As a result of that law, the
liability was upon the seller, that is, the "owner," for any accident
which occurred between the time the buyer took possession and
when he would get a certificate issued to him.' 91 For example, this
situation would arise where the sale was made in the evening,
on a Saturday or Sunday, or on a holiday, so that the purchaser
could not get a new title issued to him immediately. Therefore,
automobile dealers have had to carry insurance on these cars, and
it has been a source of trouble.192
L.B. 1174 represents a significant change in the law. Cases in this
area have spoken of the certificate of title as "conclusive of ownership"'193 or similar terms. Consider, for example, the result in
the Turpin case 94 under the law as L.B. 1174 establishes it, if the
alleged contract for sale could have been produced. The Nebraska
Supreme Court there said:
Even assuming that there was such a contract . . . Turpin was

not the owner of the Buick automobile and could not be until such

time as he produced the certificate of title thereto .... 195
L.B. 1174, § 1(1) (emphasis added). NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-1417 (Reissue 1968) provides sales of motor vehicles shall be evidenced in writing
and lists certain requirements of the instrument.
100 See, NEB. REv. STAT. § 2-401 (U.C.C. 1964). The comment to this sec189

tion states: "This section, however, in no way intends to indicate
which line of interpretation should be followed in cases where the
application of 'public' regulation depends upon a 'sale' or upon 'title'
without further definition."
191 L.B. 1174, Files of Public Works Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess.
(1969). See, Turpin v. Standard Reliance Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 233, 99
N.W.2d 26 (1959).
102 Remarks of Senator Luedtke, Floor Debate on L.B. 1174, 80th Neb.
Leg. Sess. (May 1, 1969).
'93 State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 149, 65 N.W.2d 542
(1954); Garbark v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d 315 (1952).
'94 Turpin v. Standard Reliance Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 233, 99 N.W.2d 26 (1959).
In this case Turpin allegedly signed a contract to take over payments

on an auto owned by Jones, who was leaving for the service. He did
not get the certificate but used the auto for three days before he was
involved in an accident with the auto. After a "diligent search" the
alleged contract could not be found, and Turpin testified that he could
not remember signing a contract.
195 Id. at 249, 99 N.W.2d at 36.
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The bill also has more effect than merely the fixing of liability
during the time period between sale and issuance of a new certificate of title to the buyer, although this was apparently the only
concern of the legislature in amending the prior law. A purchaser
with a written instrument, such as a bill of sale, and possession of
the automobile will prevail over a purchaser who has a certificate
of title. Suppose S sells the car to K who takes possession and
receives a receipt for it in early July. K asks for the certificate of
title, but S does not have it. It is being held by the finance company.
Plaintiff then buys the car from S for cash and pays off the lien.
S gives an employee of the plaintiff the power of attorney to assign
the certificate of title to the plaintiff. Plaintiff gets a certificate of
title issued to him on July 25. In an action between plaintiff and
K; held: plaintiff had the certificate of title and was therefore the
owner of the auto. 19 The result would be the opposite under
L.B. 1174.
L.B. 1174 upsets the reliance an individual may place upon the
certificate of title as an indication of ownership. If the legislature
had desired to take care of the problem of fixing liability only,
it would seem that it could have done so without disturbing property law.
L.B. 1174 also amends section 60-106 of the Nebraska statutes,
in providing that in all instances the certificate of title shall be
obtained by the purchaser. 197 The law originally provided that in
the sale of an automobile by a dealer to a "general purchaser or
user" that the dealer was required to obtain the certificate in the
name of the purchaser.

B. L.B. 994--RGHT-oF-WAY AT INTERSECTIONS.
The Legislature amended section 39-751 of the Nebraska statutes
relating to the right-of-way at intersections with L.B. 994.198 It
passed with the emergency clause.
The change in the law conforms to actual usage, the law of other
states' 99 and the latest revision of200the Uniform Vehicle Code. The
emphasis is on defensive driving.
196 Loyal's Auto Exchange, Inc. v. Munch, 153 Neb. 628, 45 N.W.2d 913
(1951).
197 L.B. 1174, § 2(5), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
198 L.B. 448, a companion bill, amends NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-728 (Reissue

1968), defining right-of-way for autos entering an intersection from
different highways.
199 See, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-52 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-551
(Supp. 1968); MIfcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.650 (1967); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.20(2) (1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 304.021(2) (1959); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 31-119 (Reissue 1967).
200 L.B. 994, Files of Public Works Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
Before amendment, section 39-751 stated, inter alia, that the
driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection must yield to a vehicle within the intersection and turning
left therein across the line of travel of the first vehicle. L.B. 994
provides:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left within an intersection... shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which is within the intersection
or
201
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
It would appear that in most instances the revision would give
the right-of-way to the auto approaching the intersection over the
auto in the intersection turning left, while the prior law would
have given it to the one turning left.20 2 However, it was stated in
committee that the vehicle in the intersection turning left has the
203
right-of-way.
It is significant that research reveals very few cases in which
violation of the statute in its original form ever arose as an issue.
But in those states which have statutes similar to L.B. 994, there
are many illustrations of how the statute is applied in auto accident
cases.
In such states compliance or non-compliance with the statute is
most often invoked in rear-end collisions rather than in collisions
between two autos approaching an intersection from opposite directions. The plaintiff, stopped in the intersection, is hit by the
defendant. In response to a charge of contributory negligence,
plaintiff argues that he has stopped in the intersection to yield to
approaching traffic as required by the law.20 4 Other cases involve
a situation where the defendant is hit from behind and the plaintiff alleges as negligence the defendant's stop on the highway. The
20 5
defendant then invokes the statute to show he was not negligent.
L.B. 994, § 3, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
Senator Orme stated that the bill is only a clarification with a bit of
alteration and wording simplified, perhaps implying no great substantive change in the law. Floor Debate on L.B. 994, 80th Neb. Leg.
Sess. (April 1, 1969).
203 Remarks of Mr. Ralph Nelson, L.B. 994, Files of Public Works Committee, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Mar. 7, 1969).
204 Lund v. Minn. Street Rwy. Co., 250 Minn. 550, 86 N.W.2d 78 (1957).
In Wilson v. Sorge, 256 Minn. 125, 127, 97 N.W.2d 477, 480 (1959) the
court said: "Plaintiff's conduct in the operation of her vehicle was
in accord with the rules of the road.... She also decreased her speed
and then stopped to yield the right-of-way to the oncoming vehicle as
she was required to do." (citations omitted).
205 Gustafson v. Schilt, 263 Minn. 294, 116 N.W.2d 557 (1962). Under Nebraska's range of vision rule the plaintiff in the hypothetical case
would quite likely be negligent as a matter of law and thus would
201
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L.B. 994 contains a very definite jury issue. It states that the
one in the intersection intending to turn left must yield to the
one approaching from the opposite direction in the intersection "or
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. ' 20 6 What
is an immediate hazard? Will the distance from the intersection
which constitutes an immediate hazard be the same on a rainy day
as on a sunny day? On a gravelled road as on pavement? When
the approaching vehicle is a heavily loaded truck or a small compact car? These
appear to be questions of fact and are for jury
207
determination.
At first glance a bill of this nature may appear to be relatively
insignificant, but the experience of other states shows that it may
become a widely invoked statute in tort cases. At least the situation may arise in which it will be important in the outcome of a
case.
Craig W. Thompson '71
William J. Wochner '71
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not instigate the litigation. See, Schmeling, The Range of Vision Rule
in Nebraska, 49 NEB. L. R.v. 7, (1969); Newkirk v. Kovanda, 184 Neb.
127, 165 N.W.2d 576 (1969), discussed in, Nebraska Supreme Court
Review, 49 NEB. L. REv. 537, 582 (1970).
L.B. 994, § 1(3), 80th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1969).
Mahan v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 158 Kan. 206, 146 P.2d 383;
Gardner v. Pereboom, 197 Kan. 188, 416 P.2d 67 (1966). These cases
involve KAN. STAT. Aww. § 8-551 (Supp. 1968) and its predecessor
statute which contained the identical language.

